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JURISDICT10M 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction this matter pursiuaul hi 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Whe Liu "i I In ill. i il mi Governmental Immunity Act violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment . :he United States ml i I nl i , .n I An f icle 
*
 f
 * '-e Utah Constitution b;;y denying equal 
protection ^ooess ? . airriiff 
Warren. Standard of appellate review: Equc : 
Reasc nableness ol the statutorily created classifications ar. . *„: ^ 
relationship betwui.- .i^ s i t i i >tt imi'i ntul I ho legislative 
ob j ect ive; Due process: Real and substantial i: e i a 11 i i 
r fcjij - rem* purpose • »- * - without arbitrariness ui; 
discrimination , .ondemaixii v „ x ^ . b , L , Hospital, 7 75 
^.2d 348 (Utah 1989) . 
B. i i • "il » i in 3vernmental Immunity A c t , which limits 
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a personal injury plaintiff to a one-year statute of limitation, 
is unconstitutional as in violation of the Open Courts Clause of 
the Utah State Constitution because Utah law grants personal injury 
plaintiffs a statute of limitations of four years? Standard of 
appellate review: Is a reasonable alternative remedy provided, 
and,, if not, is abrogation justified by reasonable and consistent 
means of achieving state objectives? Authority: Berry by and 
through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); and 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
C. Whether the discovery rule should be applied in this case 
to find that the one-year statute of limitation under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act did not begin to run until Warren became 
aware, or should have become aware, of his cause of action against 
the Defendcints- Authority: Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 
1981) . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
United States Constitution 
Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
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Utah Constitution 
Article Section 7 
No person shall property, 
without due process of law, 
i »i I" icle r „ Section 11 
All courts shall be open, and every foil son '.'..T J y t r y «1^ne 
to him in * )erson, property or reputation, shall have remed, -
due course administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall In: bat n I I i i in | i c sr- t 
i ?pfending before any tribunal in this State, by himsel: 
counsel, any c. i v i I i aubr I ml i 1 1 1 i party. 
Article I, Section 24 
general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953* ^~ amended. 
Section 63-
(1) A claim arises when +-1 would 
apply if*'*- « r. +* * • against a private person begins 
claim for injury against 
governmental entity against an employ 
occurring durir*1 1"v performance : :aties, within the scope 
employment, *i -• * * written 
notice claim with the entity before ..,:,,.., n, 
rogarrl uf whether or not the function giving rise t • -ne I aim 
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is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far 
as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be signed by the person 
making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian, and shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-
30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or 
imprisoned at the time the claim arises, the claimant may 
apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice 
of claim. 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental 
entity, the court may extend the time for service of 
notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that 
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, 
the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the 
notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental 
entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
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S e c t ] i mi h 3 '» 3 0-11 
,', , 1 a I .i» a g a i n s t i p o I 11 ica J G ubd : v i s i • \a i • • t , • 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance 
o£ his du11eh , '" J i i employment, :ndp.r •* ^  1 r • 
authority,, i s barred unless notice of claim 
g-ii'ii iii IMI 1 11 of the political subdivision within i *- ^— ,. -
the claim arises, or bet ore I lie uxpirat u1 "' " "i' ^tension of time 
granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whetru 
fijii i i - t I ifi i i ise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
8TATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Proceedings, 
The plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter Warren), and members of uis 
family, were * . . September 10, 1988, iii an 
aircraft accident whil* . , . .ireraft leascill IIMIII w 'i,l "in 
F"i /ers K1 v IF''"| Club 'hereinafter Western Flyers) 1 ocated the 
Provo City Airport anu i mt-appellee, Provo 
City Corporation (hereinafter Defendain , , 
summer and f <ai! months 1989, prior •> September 
J-ft!?, Aaiieii's counse. rafter la or) 
made "amerces attempts communicate ^ i n the Defendant an< s 
insurance was held L western 
Flyers as equ.red by , «, * . . , j^-
35. 28-29). 
"T"ay IL.I IU iuestfiiJ I li ' i nt'nrm.ition m wio-t^ng D> ^etter dated 
9 
September 12, 1989. (R. at 33). Defendant's response on December 
5, 1989 advised that Defendant did not have Western Flyers' 
insurance policies on file, as required by Defendant's city 
ordinances. (R. at 33). Taylor filed a Notice of Claim of injury 
and damages with Defendant on March 26, 1990, and Defendant's City 
Attorney's Office notified Taylor on April 27, 1990 that Warren's 
claim had been denied because it was filed over six months beyond 
the statute of limitations. (R. at 43-44). 
Warren's subsequent counsel of record, Wayne B. Watson, filed 
Warren's complaint against the Defendants on December 12, 1990, 
alleging, inter alia, that the Defendant's failure to enforce and 
require compliance with city, state and federal regulations 
concerning the safety and airworthiness of Warren's aircraft was 
a proximate cause of the injuries and damages to Warren. (R. at 
1-8). The Defendant moved for dismissal, and the motion was 
subsequently granted by an appropriate Order of the court filed on 
the 12th of March, 1991. (R. at 20-21) 
Relevant Facts 
On or about September 10, 1988, Charles Warren, leased an 
aircraft from Western Flyers d/b/a Western Flyers Flying Club and 
Michael McPhie, located and based at the Provo City Airport in 
Provo, Utah. (R. at 5) . Provo City Corporation licensed McPhie 
and Western Flyers Flying Club as a flying club. (R. at 6). 
Provo City Ordinance 13.03.060 defines a flying club and its 
requirements; defines that said flying club must be non-
commercial; requires said flying club to assure that each aircraft 
10 
is air worthy and in compliance with appropriate federal agency 
rules, regulations and statutes; and requires Provo City to seek 
and obtain copies of insurance policies to be in force and effect 
by the flying club in minimum amounts of Two Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($200,000.00) for each person, Five Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($500,000.00) property damage; all for each accident. The 
ordinance requires the insurance certificates to be filed with the 
Provo City Airport manager and that the policies can only be 
cancelled after thirty (30) days notice given to the airport 
manager. (R. at 6-7). 
On September 10, 1988, the Plaintiff Charles Warren, Gwen 
Warren his spouse, and Shawn Warren his son, together with a third 
passenger, took off from the Provo City Airport. (R. at 45). The 
route of the flight was from Provo, Utah to a destination in 
California and return. (R. at 45) . En route to California the 
aircraft landed at Battle Mountain, Nevada, for the purpose of 
refueling where it was serviced, fueled and dispatched. (R. at 
45) . The aircraft crashed adjacent to the Lander County Airport 
in Battle Mountain, Nevada, shortly after liftoff when its engine 
failed to develop sufficient power to enable the aircraft to become 
fully airborne and continue its flight. (R. at 44-45). The 
Plaintiff, his wife and son, and the third passenger, all sustained 
serious injuries. (R. at 3-4) . 
During the summer and fall months of 1989, and prior to 
September 10, 1989, the Plaintiff, Plaintiff's previous attorney 
Thomas S. Taylor and his office made several inquiries to Provo 
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City and its airport manager as to whether or not Western Flyers 
had complied with the Provo City Ordinance herein described ; 
particularly whether the necessary insurance was of record with the 
airport manager as required by the Ordinance. (R. at 5, 32-35, 28-
29) . After numerous attempts to get the information concerning the 
insurance and the Ordinance herein described, Plaintiff's counsel, 
Thomas S. Taylor, wrote a letter on September 12, 1989, requesting 
the information in writing and reporting the failure of Provo City 
and its airport manager to furnish the information which had been 
repeatedly sought to date. (R. at 33). 
On December 5, 1989, counsel for Provo City, Gary L. 
Gregerson, wrote to Plaintiff's counsel, Thomas S. Taylor, advising 
for the first time, that Western Flying Club had failed to respond 
to inquiries and the Provo City did not have the insurance policies 
on file. (R. at 33). The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim of 
injury and damages with Provo City, dated March 26, 1990, and 
marked as received by the Provo City Mayor on March 30, 1990. (R. 
at 44). On April 27, 1990, the Provo City Attorney's Office 
notified Plaintiff's counsel, Thomas S. Taylor, that Plaintiff's 
claim had been denied. (R. at 43-44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act violates applicable 
portions of the United States and Utah Constitutions by denying 
equal protection of the laws and due process of law to the 
Plaintiff. It violates equal protection guarantees by creating 
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arbitrary classifications of plaintiffs that deny private 
plaintiffs their right to try their case on the merits and that 
have no reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the state 
statute. It violates due process guarantees by denying a plaintiff 
his opportunity to try his case on the merits by requiring notice 
of his claim against the governmental entity before he is capable 
of giving it. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act violates the open courts 
clause of the Utah Constitution by abrogating the Plaintiff's cause 
of action without providing an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy, or without advancing in a rational manner an important 
state interest underlying the statute. The Plaintiff is left 
without his remedy by due course of law. 
Application of the discovery rule should be made in these 
exceptional circumstances in order to avoid a result that would be 
unjust and irrational. Since the Plaintiff did not discover his 
cause of action against the Defendants until after the statutory 
period of limitation had run, he had no opportunity to seek his 
rightful remedy in a court of law. The law was not intended to 
produce such harsh and unjust results. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT VIOLATES THE 14TH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 
I. SECTIONS 7 AND 24 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION BY DENYING 




The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution requires 
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST, 
amend. XIV, § 1. In similar fashion, the Constitution of Utah 
declares that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law" and that "[a] 11 laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." UTAH CONST, art. I, 
§ § 7 and 24. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§ 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 (1991), violates these constitutional 
mandates in two ways: 
a) it violates the equal protection clauses of the respective 
constitutions by (1) "imping[ing] upon a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution" or (2) by 
failing to "rationally further some legitimate, articulated state 
purpose." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 
93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973); see also, Condemarin v. 
University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989). 
b) it violates the due process clauses of the respective 
constitutions by unreasonably denying fundamental procedural 
fairness to the Plaintiff. See, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600> 
609, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed. 341 (1974); Condemarin v. University 
Hosp., at 357. 
There is a growing number of courts holding that the arbitrary 
burden placed on state claimants by this type of statute cannot 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. See, Miller v. Boone County 
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Hospital. 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986) (statutory notice requirement 
violative of equal protection); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 
539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975) (municipal tort claims statute facially 
violates equal protection); Reich v. State Highway Dept.. 194 
N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 1972) (sixty day notice provision of tort claim 
statute facially violates equal protection); Turner v. Staaasf 510 
P.2d 879 (Nev. 1973) cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 
L.Ed.2d 486 (1973) (notice of claim requirements in statute 
requiring the presentation of a claim against county within six 
months of occurrence facially denies equal protection) ; and O'Neil 
v. City of Parkersburcr, 237 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1977) (notice of 
claim provision facially violative of due process and equal 
protection rights). See also. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 
194-5 (Utah 1977) (Maughan, J., dissenting). 
A. Equal Protection 
1. Fundamental, protected rights impinged upon by 
arbitrary classification. 
"
 fEqual protection' ... emphasizes disparity in treatment by 
a State between classes of individuals whose situations are 
arguably indistinguishable." Ross v. Moffitt, at 609. Such 
disparate treatment may, in practice, invade elemental rights of 
the individual otherwise constitutionally guaranteed. San Antonio 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, at 17. One of those elemental rights 
recognized by the Utah Supreme Court is "the fundamental principle 
of American law that victims of wrongful or negligent acts should 
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be compensated to the extent that they have been harmed." 
Condemarin v. University Hosp., at 354. Indeed, this Court agreed 
with the language of the New Hampshire Supreme Court "in 
identifying the specific right to recover for negligently caused 
injuries as an 'important substantive right.'" Id. (Citing Carson 
v. Maurer. 120 N.H. 925, 931 424 A.2d 825, 830 (1980).) Similarly, 
the Washington Supreme Court found that "[t]he right to be 
indemnified for personal injuries is a substantial property right, 
not only of monetary value but in many cases fundamental to the 
injured person's physical well-being and ability to continue to 
live a decent life." Hunter v. North Mason High Schoolf 539 P.2d 
845, 848 (Wash. 1975). 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-
11 & -13 (1991) violates this fundamental right by arbitrarily 
barring victims of governmental tort from bringing their action 
while no such bar exists for victims of private tort. The Utah 
Supreme Court has previously recognized that "[tjhis Court ... 
ought not defer to legislative retention or expansion of 
governmental immunity which unreasonably burdens important 
constitutional rights." Condemarin v. University HOSP., at 363. 
In Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 679 
(Utah 1985), the Court, quoting a U.S. Supreme Court case, stated: 
Every government is under obligation to its citizens to 
afford them all needful legal remedies.... A statute 
could not bar the existing rights of claimants without 
affording this opportunity [to try rights in the courts]; 
if it should attempt to do so, it would not be a statute 
of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish 
rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its 
provisions. 
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(Quoting Wilson v. Iseminaer, 185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct. 573, 46 
L.Ed. 804 (1902).) Such rights are afforded differently to two 
classes of tort victims within the State of Utah: victims of 
private tortfeasors who enjoy a four-year statute of limitations; 
and victims of governmental tortfeasors who have a one-year statute 
of limitations. 
The case at bar provides a prime example of the victim of 
government tort whose rights are arbitrarily extinguished before 
having a chance to pursue his claim. The Plaintiff did not 
discover his cause of action until after the one-year statutory 
period had run. He was thus stripped of his remedy before he could 
discover it, and arbitrarily denied his right to try the case on 
its merits. 
2. Differences that have no reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute. 
In Condemarin v. University Hosp, this Court reiterated a two-
part test "necessary to ensure the uniform operation of the laws: 
'First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. 
Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment 
given the classes must be based on differences that have a 
reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statutes.111 
Id. at 352 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984)). 
This comports with the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution which "denies to the States *the power to 
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed 
by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly 
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unrelated to the objective of that statute.'" Stanton v. Stantonf 
421 U.S. 7, 13, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688 (1975) (quoting Reed 
v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).) 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act arbitrarily and 
unreasonably divides tortfeasors in the state of Utah into two 
classes. This division also produces a similar classification of 
tort victims. 
First, there are private tort-feasors, to whom no notice 
of claim is owed; and, second, there are governmental 
tort-feasors, to whom notice must be given. The first 
classification allows its victim the full period 
prescribed by the statute of limitations in which he may 
institute an action; the right of the victim of a 
governmental tort-feasor to sue is absolutely barred ... 
should he not give the required notice during [the 
statutorily required] period. Effectively imposed upon 
the latter is a special statute of limitations. 
O'Neil v. City of Parkersburq, 237 S.E.2d 504, 508 (W.Va. 1977)• 
"Under this statutory system, victims of governmental torts must 
seek legal advice and act to preserve their claims.... Other 
personal injury plaintiffs need only act within the limitations 
period...." Hunter v. North Mason High School, at 847. The result 
is that the government enjoys an unnatural and very often unfair 
advantage over the private party plaintiff. Actions between 
private parties are not burdened with such preconditions to tort 
recovery which "grant the one a procedural advantage not available 
to the other." Id. 
No rational basis exists for such legislative classifications, 
nor is there any reasonable relationship under today's 
circumstances between the classifications and the purpose of the 
statute. Condemarin v. University Hosp., at 352. "[T]he 
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reasonableness of the statutory classifications depends on the 
logic of the distinctions made ....lf Id. The following are 
reasons generally recognized in most jurisdictions, and most 
commonly put forward, as the legitimate state interests being 
advanced by the statutory scheme of claim notice requirements: 
a. To avoid stale claims and promote prompt 
investigations; 
b. To facilitate planning of budgets; 
c. To promote settlement of valid claims; 
d. To repair defective conditions; and, 
e. To reduce the difficulties occasioned by the size 
of governmental institutions and the number of activities they are 
involved in. See. Miller v. Boone County Hospital. 394 N.W.2d 776, 
779-80 (Iowa 1986); Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 
482 (Utah 1980); Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 
1977); Hunter v. North Mason High School, at 848-850; Day v. 
Memorial Hospital of Guymon. 844 F.2d 728, 731 (10th Cir. 1988); 
Fritz v. Regents of the University of Colorado. 586 P.2d 23, 25 
(Colo. 1978). Such reasons as are suggested are not valid today. 
The interests purportedly underlying §§ 63-30-11 & -13 of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act bear no rational relationship to the 
classifications created, and have been observed to "have more basis 
in conjecture than [in] actuality." Miller v. Boone County 
Hospital, at 779. For example, 
a. Stale claims. Utah's general statute of 
limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 would protect governmental 
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organizations from stale claims in the same manner as it protects 
private citizens. "The odds may even be in favor of local 
governments, who have police departments, attorneys and other 
personnel at their disposal to investigate the causes and effects 
of accidents." Miller v. Boone County Hospital, at 779. Many 
governmental bodies are small enough as to be immediately informed 
o"f events likely to expose them to liability. Hunter v. North 
Mason High School, at 849. And, inasmuch as the plaintiff bears 
* 
the burden to prove negligence, any difficulties of proof 
experienced by the local government would also be born by the 
plaintiff. Miller v. Boone County Hospital, at 779. See also, 
Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087, 1094-95 (Utah 1989). 
b. Planning budgets. It is unlikely that governments 
need special warning in order to prepare for the possibility of 
being sued. "Local governments 'rarely budget for claims1...." 
Miller v. Boone County Hospital, at 779. It is even more unlikely 
that a notice of claim produces the intragovernmental budgetary 
action it was intended to generate. In some cases no action is 
necessary because of insurance. "Special notice of possible future 
claims does little to facilitate budget planning, as governmental 
entities so small as to be unable to use actuarial methods to 
forecast liabilities and self-insure, usually will purchase 
insurance like any private individual or corporation." Hunter v. 
North Mason High School, at 849. 
c. Promoting settlement. Encouraging the two parties 
to an action to negotiate and settle is every bit as worthy a goal 
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of a private party as it is of a governmental entity. Id. at 850. 
In addition, often lengthy periods of time may pass before the full 
nature and degree of a person's injuries may be known, or, in some 
cases, before the injured plaintiff may be well enough to consult 
an attorney. Settlement is unlikely given that set of 
circumstances. Miller v. Boone County Hospital, at 780. But it 
is quite likely that the plaintiff will find his cause of action 
time-barred. 
d. Repairing defective conditions. Once again, this 
type of interest is shared completely by the two classes of 
tortfeasors. Its importance is no greater for the government than 
for the private tortfeasor. "It is unreasonable to suppose that 
the government's ability to discover and repair defective 
conditions is tied to a notice that a lawsuit will be filed.... 
Moreover, if repair of defective conditions were a legitimate 
interest, the legislature would have required notice of them 
whenever a person is injured, regardless of the tort-feasor or any 
intent to file a claim." Id. 
e. Reducing difficulties of large and widespread 
government. Any distinction based upon the broad exposure of 
government fails to account for the equally legitimate equivalent 
concerns of private parties. 
We perceive no valid reason for requiring such notice to 
a municipality while no notice need be given to a private 
tort-feasor. The latter can be and often is larger and 
more widely extended than our municipalities. The stated 
reasons for requiring notice to a city, other than 
protection of public coffers, apply equally to many 
private tort-feasors; and protection of the public 
coffers never justifies the violation of a constitutional 
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right. Neither is there a rational basis for the 
requirement of the notice of claim where the injured 
party is concerned — and it is his constitutional rights 
which are of paramount concern. 
O'Neil v. Citv of Parkersburg, at 508. See alsof Hunter v. North 
Mason High School, at 850. As a class, municipal and governmental 
bodies "are neither larger nor more liability-prone than the class 
of private tortfeasors, which includes everything from single 
individuals to giant corporations financially larger even than the 
State." Hunter v. North Mason High School, at 849. 
These "grounds of difference" are actually a study of the 
similarities in interests of the two defined classes. Such diverse 
treatment of members of a class that is fostered in pursuit of the 
State's interests constitutes "an arbitrary and unreasonable 
variance in the treatment of both portions of one natural class and 
is, therefore, barred by the constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection." Reich v. State Highway Dept., 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 
(Mich. 1972) This Court recognizes the standard of review that 
"[w]hether the ... statute can be justified as a reasonable measure 
in furtherance of the public interest depends upon whether the 
restriction of private rights sought to be imposed is not so 
serious that it outweighs the benefits sought to be conferred upon 
the general public*" Condemarin v. University Hosp., at 354. In 
such a balancing test however, the foregoing justifications are not 
reasonable counterweights to private interests, but are in fact 
expressions of equally valid private interests as well. 
Beyond the critical and decisive fact that the underlying 
interests of §§ 63-30-11 & -13 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
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York: 
The effect oi; ['I'" l^ -^ J- clam notice statute] is 
unfair in that it creates two separate and distinct 
classes of plaintiffs. The first class is the private 
plaintiff who sues a private defendant. This plaintiff 
is a lucky plaintiff because he has three years in which 
to assert a negligence claim. [The statute] creates a 
second subsidiary class of plaintiffs who must file their 
formal notice of claim against the County within 9 0 days 
otherwise their claim is total.] y defeated and barr ed 
regardless of its merits. 
This is not justice, In the United States there 
should not be any second-class plaintiffs just as there 
should not be any second class citizens. The United 
States Constitution guarantees equal protection of the 
laws to all. Enforcement of the short-time limit of [the 
statute] is unequal protection. It gives the municipality 
an unfair advantage over a private litigant. 
This is denial of due process and equal protection 
of the laws under the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the State of New York. 
Everyone must stand before the court without fear 
or favor. Everyone must stand before the law without an 
artificial cloak of a special short-time limit 
>c;^ r y. Pouna. 
Cit^ *" . ,9 
Siror -ucion requires that a party have the 
same amount of time to bring a tort action against the government 
as he or she would have to bring the action against a private 
tortfeasor." Daaas v. Citv of Seattle, 750 P.2d 626, 628 (Wash. 
1988) . Otherwise the familiar fact pattern of this case will occur 
time and again, wherein a plaintiff, by unknowing failure to give 
notice to the governmental tortfeasor, will be arbitrarily barred 
from seeking compensation for injuries, while his counterpart 
bringing action against a private tortfeasor will suffer no such 
bar. Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 should be found 
unconstitutional. 
B. Due Process 
The emphasis in a due process analysis focuses on factors of 
fairness to the individual in his dealings with the State. Ross 
v. Moffitt, at 609. There are marked similarities between an equal 
protection analysis and a due process analysis. The question asked 
here is whether §§ 63-30-11 & -13 are consistent with the 
requirements of fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of 
the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution as it applies to 
the Plaintiff Warren, and, again, whether the requirements of the 
act bear some real and substantial relation to the purpose of the 
act, and are "neither arbitrary nor discriminatory." Condemarin 
v. University Hosp. , at 356. See also, OfNeil v. City of 
Parkersbura, at 509. In fact they do not. 
Sections 63-30-11 & -13 violate principles of fundamental 
fairness in that they assume that all individuals, outside a 
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[i]t is not within the power of the legislature, under 
the guise of a limitation provision# to cut off an 
existing remedy entirely, since this would amount to a 
denial of justice, and, manifestly, an existing right of 
action cannot be taken away by legislation which shortens 
the period of limitation to a time that has already run, 
Ben i v ex rel . net i y. i, Beech Axicralt Cm ii, i i 111 
The limitation period ot § 63-30-1J i * not reasonable under 
the circumstances arqued by t lit* Plaintiff, and reasonableness of 
t h e s t a t u t t iiin I Lai iiiiiillii HI mini a I I III • i i uiiimst am as 
"[l']t is well settled that the legislature may change 
[forms of action and modes of remedy] at its discretion, 
provided adequate means of enforcing the right remain. 
In all such cases, the question is one of reasonableness, 
and we have, therefore, only to consider whether the time 
allowed in this statute is, under all the circumstances, 
reasonable." 
Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63, 22 S.Ct. 573, 46 L.Ed. 804 
(1902) (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions, giving heed to this 
principle, have enacted statutes containing provisions authorizing 
relief from a failure to comply with filing requirements based on 
a showing of "reasonable excuse". See generally, Annot., 55 
A.L.R.3d 930 (1974). Thus they provide reasonable methods of 
dealing with all the circumstance^ and curing unforeseen defects. 
Sections 63-30-11 & -13 clearly violate due process requirements 
and should be found unconstitutional, at very least, to the degree 
that they fail to provide the Plaintiff an adequate means of 
enforcing his right through a reasonable excuse clause. 
II. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT VIOLATES THE OPEN 
COURTS CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Many of the arguments made thus far in this brief find 
substantial application as well in an open courts analysis of §§ 
63-30-11 & -13. This Court has stated the applicability of a due 
process analysis in this context thus: 
fTo a degree, the open courts provision is an extension 
of the due process clause. Indeed, the open courts 
provision and the due process clause also have an 
overlapping function, to some extent, with respect to the 
abrogation of causes of action....1 Indeed, the two-
part test articulated in Berry, at least in part, 
requires a classic due process analysis...." 
Condemarin v. University Hosp.f at 357 (quoting from Berrv ex rel. 
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First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an 
injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy 'by due course of law1 for vindication, of his 
constitutional interest..,. Second, if there is no 
substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation of 
the remedy or cause of action may be justified only :i £ 
there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated 
and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not 
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective 
Berr y ex re I, „. .Berry. _.v... Beech Aircraft, i Condemarin v. 
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compensation." Wrolstad v. Industrial nramn'n of utahr 786 P.2d 
243, 245 (1990). Sections 63-30-11 & -13 provide no remedy for 
Plaintiffs unfortunate enough to be in such circumstances; and once 
the period has run, the favorably affected municipality can breathe 
a sigh of relief, and thank the statute that it has escaped yet 
another lawsuit which it did not care to defend on the merits. 
Absent a finding that the statute lacks a rational basis and 
means of implementation, as argued above, it should be found at 
very least that §§ 63-30-11 & -13 violate the open courts clause 
of the Utah Constitution by failing to allow a reasonable period 
of time for the Plaintiff to discover his cause of action and 
submit the proper notice. The Plaintiff should be allowed to prove 
as part of his case that the delay was reasonable or the statute 
should provide an alternative. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held 
that "[determining when [the governmental organizations role] 
reasonably should have been discovered is a question of material 
fact..." which should thus be left to the trier of fact. Doe v. 
Durtschi, 716 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Idaho 1986) (emphasis in original). 
Denying application of the discovery rule for these circumstances 
certainly does not rationally further any state interests 
underlying §§ 63-30-11 & -13. Nor would application of the rule 
thwart those interests. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE DISCOVERY RULE IS APPROPRIATE 
TO OVERCOME THE UNJUST EFFECTS THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IN THESE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Introduction 
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A. "The govern i ng r . 
United States Supreme Court s that statutes ^1 limitations ire 
designed 1 - arises through •—_ 
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have 
disappeared,,M Myers v. McDonald, 635 P. 2d 84 (Utah 1981)(quoting 
Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 
U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). Justice Oakes, in Myers. added the 
following: 
In furtherance of that policy, the general rule is that 
a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action. Under 
that rule, mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of 
action does not prevent the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
There are a number of exceptions to this general rule. 
In some enumerated areas of the law, our Legislature has 
adopted the discovery rule by statute so that the 
limitations period does not begin to run until the 
discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of 
action. In other circumstances, where the statute of 
limitations would normally apply, this Court has held 
that proof of concealment or misleading by the defendant 
precludes the defendant from relying on the statute of 
limitations....Finally, without regard to proof of 
wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, the courts of 
some states have adopted the discovery rule by judicial 
action as to exceptional circumstances or causes of 
action where the application of the general rule would 
be irrational or unjust. Those precedents point the way 
toward what we deem to be the appropriate decision in 
this case. Myers, at 86. 
The Myers case dealt with guardians of a missing child, who 
were unable to file a cause of action until after the statute of 
limitations had run, due to the lack of sufficient information in 
order to do so, absent any intentional misleading or concealment 
on the part of the defendants. Justice Oakes cited a throng of 
rulings supporting such judicial creation. 
In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148-9 (Utah 1979) the 
court addressed the need for a discovery rule doctrine in order to 
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case, the eouii, saiti: 
To say that a cause of ac ti on accrues to a person when 
she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, 
that it accrues before she has or can reasonably be 
expected to have knowledge of any wrong inflicted upon 
her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She cannot 
maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say 
to one who has been wronged, "You had a remedy, but 
before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law 
stripped you of your remedy, • makes a mockery of the law. 
?ee also, Wrolstad v. Industrial Commfn of Utah, nn i ,
 k.n ..<-<! i i i, 
dec, jn Dickinson and Co. v, Reese, 668 P. 2d 12 54, 1257 (Utah 198 J); 
i r-'d Vincent v. 5dii ^<±ke Cumitv 1  l I 11 1 111 111 i in 1 n r R 1 
The Utai . . , n v m Court has impliedly recognized I he 
L uii« discovery doctrine to k 6 1-30-13 of the Utah 
°? v* Vernal Kingly Healiii ^eiitei " 1 
(Ut^r 1 9 8 0 ) . the Court, in holding that the plaxiii.il £ * b cidini was 
I i I 11 in nin1 lv ii Notice of Claim, star PI I in i 
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circumstances wher< .i«int;ft might arguably overcome the i ne 
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c ummarv iudqemen* fr^ lefendant in »i i i win•re I lie 
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misleading informal 2 ,!-*',:• » **
 : >•%?: office of " l,t Utah 
sidle "Hi'im i"p - ^o ui uie iact, as pointed out 
by the dissenting opinion in the case, that the plaintiff had in 
her possession the correct information which would have allowed her 
to expose the inaccuracies contained in the information given by 
the state agency, and thus file her Notice of Claim in a timely 
manner. In this case, the Plaintiff had received no response from 
Defendants, yet he had no other means of obtaining the information 
they needed and diligently sought. The Plaintiff should not be 
held to a higher standard. 
B. This is a case wherein the imposition of the discovery 
rule as set forth in Myers is appropriate. The Myers case is 
similar to the case at hand in that the Plaintiff could not in good 
faith file a Notice of Claim against Provo City without knowing, 
or at least concluding, whether or not the Defendants Provo City 
Corporation and James R. Mathis had imposed compliance with city 
ordinances upon Michael McPhie and Western Flyers Flying Club. 
Accordingly, it was necessary for the Plaintiff to acquire that 
information first. 
The Plaintiff, and the Plaintifffs counsel and office staff, 
over the course of the summer of 1989, made numerous attempts to 
obtain the information in question from the Defendant James R. 
Mathis and the Defendant Provo City Corporation. Refer to Exhibits 
"A" and "Bfi located at Record pages 28-30 & 32-36. Yet the 
Plaintiff did not discover the failure to enforce or failure to 
comply with the Ordinances in question until the arrival of the 
Defendants1 letter of December 5, 1989, after the one-year period 
of time for filing notice had passed. The Plaintiff did not even 
32 
i i mil iMinolate a d d i t i o n of t'he D e f e n d a n t s tu I l ls l a w s u i t u n t i l 111 
d i s c o v e r y o f i< k u k n l i m i • 111 H I M I M I IIIII i Il in i mi II 11 IIIII II 1I<IJI u n e r a t i i r n i 
p r a c t i c e s of Western Flyer11. H y i n g i lull mnil UH J D e f e n d a n t s . 
mi11 i i i»•»« i y I I i« P1) i i HIt i i f (11 f 1 i i I IP t he N o t i c e o f C1 a i m , <:if t e r a 
p e r i o d of f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t J " "j , * i I w i il 111 m i I i » 
he d i s c o v e r e d h i s c a u s e of a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e D e f e n d a n t s . 
" i i i" I +^- *h n " t ih HHIMU of i"*ivi 1 P r o c e d u r e 
(199 i) r e q u i r e s t h a t a c o m p l a i n t be I i li I ' IM H ' > l e d j e , 
i n f o r m a t i o n , and b e l i e f formed a f t e r r e a s o n a b l e i n q u i r y " and mv,t 
ii i^i fjii 11 ii ! i r Mif iaJ ' | r v i s t i n q hi* ir *t "( f 
f a i t h argument i IHHMI.I a d d e d ) . The nc 1 enudnl . « 
suqr ins ted t h a t P l a i n t i f f s h o u l d have f i l e d t h e N o t i c e of c Lmm 
ai |<i in iiiLil t h e iu.j i enuiin i i mi i j i | i i IMIIM I IIIII J <itnto i f 1 i m i t a t i o n s 
from r u n n i n g . Even so , such an a c t i o n won hi iiiiwi1 ot MI impossi i in 
in mi 111 mi mi d f t e r rhn P l a i n t i f f ' s r e c e i p t of t h e De fendan t s i i I i i i i 
December > ll'HI'ii , mi v \w in i l I llli ii I inn I I iiiii l t f li i I in 
i n f o r m a t i o n upon which in "uiilii ll.i.ii i "laim a g a i n s t I lie 
IV
 nuiiM not i i u t o m a t i c a l l y assume t h a t t h e 
Def eandant & *
 t • *- . u ixon J 1 I 111»i i ur J m 11.\i11 i«^ 
Without t IIP existence-* of <i good f a i t h b a s i s fo r s u s p e c t i n g 
t f\ I ii i i i in! i i 11 II | mi in i i I i in | i f i r | iim at- t h e t imp • I»^J 
D e f e n d a n t s a l l e g e i " s n o u i d have IJ»,M w* " i « > « 
r e q u i r e d some i m a g i n a t i o n and c r y s t a l b a l l g a z i n g on t h e pa r i J ! 
t h e I Li J nl J ' . i l tt i i' .i fi" M . ' hi p p f e n d a n t s wns, n r 
would II i b e e n , a l l e g e d u n l e s s .niuo iji• I . I l i s e o v t i , 
d e f i c i e n c i e s which n a t u r a l l y and l o g i c a l l y l e d Lo f u r t h e r i n q u i r y 
33 
and investigation. The Defendants' concept of the Plaintiff's lack 
of diligence is based on 20/20 hindsight of the facts. Under the 
circumstances at the time, however, the Plaintiff acted in all 
diligence to ascertain the pertinent facts of his case. 
C. It was Defendant Mathis' and Defendant Provo City 
Corporation's unexplained refusal to respond to the Plaintiff's 
repeated phone calls, and to answer and address the issues raised 
by the Plaintiff in his letter of September 12, 1989 in a timely 
manner that led to the running of the statute of limitations. The 
Defendants have focused on the date of their first known contact 
with the Plaintiff. However, the Court should note that Plaintiff 
did not try to contact the Provo City Attorney's Office. Rather, 
contact was made with the Mayor's Office and the Airport Manager's 
Office. That the City Attorney's Office responded to counsel's 
letter on December 5, 1989, nearly three months after it was 
mailed, further demonstrates the delay worked upon the Plaintiff 
by the Defendants. The City Attorney's Office claim that it did 
not hear from the Plaintiff or the Plaintiff's counsel is not 
relevant to the issues of the Plaintiff's diligence, of when the 
Plaintiff knew or should have known of his cause of action against 
the Defendants, and of the Defendants' actions or non-action which 
caused the delays. 
It is at least arguable that denial of the Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss in the lower court would have been warranted based upon 
facts demonstrating that the nondisclosure of the information in 
question was intentional. Apparently, the Defendant Provo City 
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159 P.2d 24, 26; and numerous other sources). 
D. In Klinaer v. Kiahtlv, 791 P.2d 868, 871 (Utah 1990), the 
court revisited the Myers court question of application of the 
discovery rule, in the context of a surveyor negligence case. The 
court noted several arguments which would favor application of the 
discovery rule. In this case, the Plaintiffs share similar 
arguments to be considered in determining the applicability of the 
discovery rule: 
(1) an innocent party should not carry the burden of a 
government agency's failure to respond; 
(2) it would be illogical to expect the plaintiffs to have 
resorted to other sources to obtain the information than what 
they did; 
(3) the plaintiffs lacked the means or ability to ascertain 
when a Notice of Claim should have been filed until the proper 
information was provided to them by the Defendants; 
(4) strict application of the statute of limitation would be 
unjust; 
(5) the short passage of time would not make the defendants' 
testimonial proof of a defense more difficult; 
(6) the short passage of time does not entail the danger of 
surprises, stale claims, lost evidence, faded memories, 
witnesses who have disappeared, or speculative or uncertain 
claims; and 
(7) recovery by the Plaintiffs will promote a higher standard 
of governmental dealings with the public, as well as a higher 
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-ai xuvi, unconstitutional limitations, I U I the foregoing reasons, 
J / 
the Plaintiff requests this Court to reverse the erroneous 
dismissal ordered by the District Court. 
DATED this *- 7 day of June, 1991. 
X3 
WAYNE B. WATSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES R. WARREN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a ) ORDER 
municipal corporation; JAMES R. ) 
MATHIS, as airport manager ) 
for the Provo City ) 
Corporation Airport; ) Civil No. 900400907 
JOHN DOES 1-10 ) 
) Judge Ray Harding 
Defendants', Provo City Corporation and James R. Mathis, 
Motion to Dismiss was considered by the Court based upon the motion 
and reply submitted by David C. Dixon for defendants and the 
response submitted by Wayne B. Watson for plaintiff. 
After considering all of the documents submitted by the 
parties, the Court finds that plaintiff failed to comply with the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act by failing to file a notice of claim 
within the one year statute of limitations (see U.C.A. §63-30-11). 
Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, JUDGED AND DECREED: 
The Motion to Dismiss of defendants Provo City and James R. 
Mathis is granted and the case against these defendants is 
dismissed with prejudice. 
-2-
DATED this day of 
Approved as to form: 
/£ 
e B. Watson W^vjfr 
, 1991, 
Judge Ray M. H a r d i n g 
F o u r t h D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
********** 
CHARLES R. WARREN, 
Plaintiff, Case Number 900400907 
-VS- RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, et al. 
Defendants. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
********** 
The Court having considered defendants7 motion to 
dismiss hereby grants such motion. The Court finds that the 
plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act (U.C.A. sections 63-30-13 et seq.) which requires that a 
person having a claim for injury must file a notice of claim 
(U.C.A. section 63-30-11) within one year after the claim 
arises, otherwise the claim is barred. A claim in the present 
matter should have been filed by September 11, 1989 at the 
latest. Plaintiff's notice of claim was clearly untimely when 
filed on March 30, 1990. 
The Court finds that plaintiff's own negligence 
prohibited him from filing a timely notice of claim; however, 
even assuming that defendants7 intentionally concealed the 
insurance policies noted by plaintiff, such concealment did 
not prevent plaintiff from filing an adequate notice of claim 
within the statutory period. 
Counsel for defendants to prepare an order consistent 
with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing 
counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
court for signature. 
Dated this 20th day of Februa^r^991' 
kM. HARDING, JUtyGE 
cc: David C. Dixon, Esq. 
Wayne B. Watson, Esq. 
